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Abstract
We propose a novel dual processing model of linguistic routinisation, specifically formulaic ex-
pressions (from relatively fixed idioms, all the way through to looser collocational phenomena).
This model is formalised using the Dynamic Syntax (DS) formal account of language processing,
whereby we make a specific extension to the core DS lexical architecture to capture the dynamics of
linguistic routinisation. This extension is inspired by work within cognitive science more broadly.
DS has a range of attractive modelling features, such as full incrementality, as well as recent ac-
counts of using resources of the core grammar for modelling a range of dialogue phenomena, all of
which we deploy in our account. This leads to not only a fully incremental model of formulaic lan-
guage, but further, this straightforwardly extends to routinised dialogue phenomena. We consider
this approach to be a proof of concept of how interdisciplinary work within cognitive science holds
out the promise of meeting challenges faced by modellers of dialogue and discourse.
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1. Orientation
In this paper we propose a unified approach to the relation between linguistic knowledge and linguis-
tic experience, specifically, we present a new approach to modelling linguistic routinisation which,
among other things, offers a way of capturing within the same framework the use of both formulaic
and non-formulaic language in dialogue. As we discuss below, these phenomena have numerous
distinct properties, yet they also share features directly relevant for formal modelling (see Nunberg
et al. (1994)). Focusing on actual language use, we formally model the relative incrementality of
both formulaic and non-formulaic language.
Our theoretical framework is inspired by work on dual process models of cognitive phenomena,
in particular interaction within dialogue (Barr and Keysar (2006) provide in part a recent overview).
Specifically, we model the interaction between rule-based and memory-based processing of natural
language, formally implementing this within Dynamic Syntax (DS, Kempson et al. (2001), Cann
et al. (2005)). While DS has typically focused on rule-based processing, we seek to extend this by
arguing that actual patterns of linguistic phenomena, as found for example in dialogue, emerge out
of the interaction between these distinct processes. For us, processing formulaic language is more
likely to involve retrieval of items stored as wholes than computed online (details about this below),
compared to the rule-driven processing underlying non-formulaic language.
For this formalisation of dual processing, we extend the lexical architecture of DS, so that lexical
entries incorporate both the usual DS lexical actions, but also include the output semantic structures
which result from employing such lexical actions. This sets up two competing processes for up-
dating the representation being constructed for a speaker’s utterance, a slower one based on lexical
actions, and a faster one based on stored semantic structure (see Gargett (2010) for details). Im-
portantly, in making this extension, we are concerned with retaining attractive properties of the DS
account. In particular, we aim to preserve the dynamics of the model, retaining fully incremental
processing within the context of interaction. We are able to effectively account for the dynamics of
routinised dialogue phenomena via modifications to the DS model at the lexical level alone. This
might be viewed as one in a line of recent proposals for lexicalist modelling of dialogue phenomena
(e.g. Kecskes (2008)).
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2. Motivations
Our approach is distinct from previous dual process models of dialogue in that we focus on core
grammatical resources to model interaction, in line with previous Dynamic Syntax work (Purver
et al. (2006), Gargett et al. (2009)), aiming to investigate the extent to which dialogue can be mod-
elled using mechanisms specified by the grammar.1 This mechanistic approach to modelling formu-
laic language, or multi-word expressions (MWEs), makes a break with the orthodoxy of property-list
approaches which define MWEs via a list of linguistic properties, such as relative compositional-
ity, idiosyncrasy of meaning, selectivity for discontinuous formulaic expressions, etc (e.g. Nunberg
et al. (1994)). We avoid modelling directly in terms of properties, following the reasoning in Raw-
son (2004), regarding drawbacks of this. Instead, Rawson suggests mechanistic models (specifically
those of Logan (1988) and Anderson (1992)), which we find fit remarkably well to our adopted ap-
proach to incremental processing.
For our purposes, linguistic routinisation involves long-term storing and reuse of context, with
context taken to be the previous words plus their mode of construal (details to be made precise).
Interlocutors may routinise the grammatical or semantic aspects of words or phrases, within a single
turn or across multiple turns. Such routinisation is highly sensitive to specific features of the context
of an interaction, such features typically triggering the routine. A note: defining the time periods
relevant for the emergence of routines is somewhat problematic (given the fuzziness of notions of
language, language use and context); here we will define short-term reuse as reuse of words and
their construal immediately following the initial use, medium term as reuse later in the interaction,
and long-term as reuse on some subsequent occasion of interaction.
2.1 Dynamics of incrementality
Milward (1994) proposes that incrementality involves:
(i) as much information being extracted as soon as possible
(ii) carried out in small steps approximately as each word is encountered
In a way that we will make more precise below, we can think of incremental processing of an
incoming string of words as a kind of stepping through the string of items while constructing the
unfolding representation. Then the processing of formulaic language can be seen as skipping over
chunks of items rather than stepping through every possible individual item. Consider how a hearer
might process the information provided by an utterance of:
(1) ‘Bob left’
Natural language utterances, like all kinds of natural phenomena, unfold in time, such temporal
dimension of processing being a feature of dynamical systems (Ward (2002)). Such systems are
inherently incremental, with input updating one state to the next. First, the occurrence of the name
‘Bob’:
(2) STATE1 Bob→ STATE2
1. To a first approximation, and for ease of exposition, grammatical mechanisms are here simply taken to be the rules
and representations of an adopted formal grammar model, in this case DS (analogous to the second representational
level in Marr (1982), that of the algorithms and data structures of some formal model).
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is the initial term in the unfolding utterance, and also licenses the hearer to expect an upcoming
predicate, among other terms, in the construal of that utterance. Further, the hearer could even try to
make a guess as to which Bob is being referred to (assuming a place-holder model of names). Such
considerations suggest this kind of processing is goal-driven.
Presuming an intuitive, evidence-driven model of communication,2 interlocutors are presumed
to operate in a goal-driven way, guided by expectations about what is coming up (determined via
current evidence from the ongoing interaction). The expectation of a predicate is satisfied by the
occurrence of ‘left’, triggering a transition to the next state:
(3) STATE2 left→ STATE3
However, note that prior to the actual occurrence of this item, and the particular information it
imparts (e.g. that no other items are required for a saturated proposition), any of a number of other
ways of completing the utterance are possible (e.g. a transitive predicate such as likes). Another
possibility is that of completing the utterance with the idiomatic ‘kicked himself’, processed as a
chunk:
(4) STATE2 kicked himself−→ STATE3
Further, we might also wonder whether alternatives such as ‘kicked herself’, ‘kicked’ (non-idiomatic),
etc, are available, and at what point (see discussion of implementation issues below).
Dynamical modelling involves observing changes to some phenomenon over time at discrete
time-steps (Ward (2002)), whereby complex systems can be modelled via “snapshots” of successive
stages in the system’s progress, these being idealised as successive states of the system, plus transi-
tions between these states (Milward (1994)). As a dynamic process, parsing can be characterised in
terms of observed states and transitions between such states. Some parsing research suggests such
transitions are made eagerly rather than delayed (e.g. until more information is available), with
problems arising if a chosen search path turns out to be wrong with respect to upcoming linguistic
information (e.g. the so-called garden-pathing of expressions like ‘The horse raced past the barn
fell’) (Sturt and Lombardo (2005)).
So in this more abstract view of incrementality as stepping through stages in the development
of an output process of some system, key implementation issues include (e.g. Crocker (2010)):
(i) the degree of eagerness, (ii) whether parallel or serial parsing strategies are employed, (iii)
whether/not the process is monotonic. This suggests classifying incremental approaches depending
on whether/not they exhibit such features. To this end, we aim for a unified account of formulaic
and non-formulaic language with a parallel flavour (see Section (2.3) below for details of how we
go about this).
2.2 Empirical details
2.2.1 IDIOMS IN DIALOGUE
Let’s start with some clearly context-dependent set of phenomena provided by the following ellip-
tical dialogue fragments ((a) – (e)):
2. Which is to say, interlocutors communicate by cycling through stages of presenting evidence of the information they
wish to impart (in the case of speakers), and evidence of the information they have accepted (in the case of hearers).
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(5)
A: Have you seen Mary?
(a) B: Mary?
(b) B: No, I haven’t.
(c) B: She’s out I think.
(d) B: I have, Bill.
(e) B: No, nor Bob.
The interpretation of such fragments requires at least linguistic context (A’s question), as well as
non-linguistic context. Indeed, context either directly provides linguistic evidence for completion,
or else this is more indirect. The examples in (5) above are all examples where the context provides
direct linguistic input for processing the fragments, for example, A’s original utterance forming the
context for B’s utterance in (a), providing predicate and subject information.
A complication arises with a more indirect mode of construal occurring in so-called “sloppy”
ellipsis. Consider the following examples:3
(6)
John took his clients to the cleaners, and so did Bill
“Bill took John’s clients to the cleaners” (strict)
“Bill took Bill’s clients to the cleaners” (sloppy)
So in (6), we have a strict interpretation in which some content is taken directly from context, but in
addition, a sloppy reading, via reusing some aspect of meaning from context (the referent resolving
the anaphoric reference of ‘his’) but nevertheless with distinct content.4
Now, placing the idiom in example (6) within an elliptical context illustrates how idioms are
compositional and sensitive to items they combine with (see Nunberg et al. (1994)):
(7) John took his clients to the cleaners, but never his shirts
In example (7), substituting an inanimate for an animate nominal (i.e. ‘shirts’ for ‘clients’) removes
the cues which trigger the idiom, resulting in a switch to non-formulaic processing, despite the very
same representation being reused for the second clause (see the analysis of ellipsis in Cann et al.
(2007)).
Example (7) demonstrates one kind of incrementality of formulaic language, and here is another
in the context of dialogue:
(8)
A: Bob took his clients to...
B: the cleaners.
A: Actually, I was going to say to his uncle’s restaurant.
Splitting idioms across dialogue turns suggests their processing is as incremental as non-formulaic
language. Note, this involves not only the processing of strings, but also the construction of repre-
sentations.This perhaps would not come as a surprise to those accounts which for the last decade
have been arguing for the compositionality of formulaic language (e.g. Nunberg et al. (1994)).
3. The meaning of ‘take NP to the cleaners’ being “To take a significant quantity of NP’s money or valuables, through
gambling, unfavorable investing, fraud, litigation, etc.’ (http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/take to the cleaners).
4. These two readings are given a formally unitary account through the use of abstraction and higher order unification
by Dalrymple et al. (Dalrymple et al. (1991)), but the DS account proposed by Purver et al. (2006) is that in which the
actions used in building up interpretation are themselves stored in context and, in the sloppy forms of interpretation,
re-used to yield distinct denotational content.
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2.2.2 PRE-FABS IN MAZE DESCRIPTIONS
A key focus here is the emergence within dialogue of looser forms of routinised language, such as
pre-fab (i.e. conventionalised collocation, see Bybee (2006), more details in Section (2.3) below).
Pickering and Garrod (2005) present an influential model of linguistic routinisation, based in large
part on patterns discovered in maze task experiments. Now, a robust observation about these exper-
iments is that participants tend to produce a restricted number of so-called description types, from
more concrete (e.g. figural “the sticking out bit at the bottom”, line “at the end of bottom row”) to
more abstract (e.g. path “two across, one up”, matrix “2,9”) ways of describing/conceptualising the
maze.
However, whether these categorisations in fact capture distinct, independent types of language
is not entirely clear, given the complexity of the various constraints under which the linguistic sys-
tem operates during dialogue.5 For example, figurative language might be employed in conditions
of greater uncertainty (as proposed in Bavelas (2009)). Consider this in terms of minimal effort vs.
maximal effect: a more concrete yet elaborate description (e.g. “the left indicator bit on the right top
corner”) could be harder to produce yet more likely understood by someone, whereas a more trun-
cated and specialised form (e.g. “two across, one up”) will be easier to produce but understanding
it may require task-relevant experience.
An experimental task that naturally leads to routinisation is the maze location description task
reported in Healey (1997). Here interlocutors communicate with each other in order to identify a
set of twenty maze locations. Given the repetitive nature of this task, over the course of interaction,
they tend to routinise these descriptions in predictable ways. Consider the following example of one
such maze location description:
(9)
(i) A: ummm, it’s the top right hand corner two down,
(ii) B: two down right so [it’s the]
(iii) A: [so it’s] kind of three down really but it’s only two down,
(iv) B: okay
(v) A: if there isn’t one in the top left hand corner,
(vi) B: right,
(vii) A: right?
Here the meaning of ‘down’ is negotiated quite explicitly, with respect to the specific context,
namely the shape of the particular maze A is describing to B. This kind of dialogue routinisa-
tion involves linguistically encoding some aspect of non-linguistic context which the interlocutors
have made mutually salient through their interaction (using specific linguistic resources useful for
picking out bits of the world). Importantly, routinisation adds to this the possibility that future sim-
ilar interaction will reflect/reuse aspects of this particular interaction. Yet, it has been observed that
this trend is not unidirectional, and can in fact reverse, especially when problems arise (e.g. Healey
(2008)).
For example, in subsequent interaction, ‘some number down’ is more likely to refer to a point
from the top of the actual maze than, say, the putative top of the smallest square the entire maze fits
into. Interestingly, A and B might employ ‘down’ in this way in subsequent interactions with other
interlocutors, and some times this may work, particularly if they are doing this against a background
5. At the very least, there is likely interaction between linguistic and conceptual systems, involving not only preferred
ways of talking in interaction, but also preferred ways of conceptualising mazes.
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community-wide set of interactions. However, if in egocentric fashion they wrongly presume the
same routine should work with any subsequent interlocutor,6 they may well run into difficulty that
causes such routines to be ineffective. We are here interested in the question of what might they
do next. One answer is that they will typically switch to other, more computational (rather than
memory-based) kinds of linguistic processing, which we discuss elsewhere (e.g. Gargett (2010)).
2.3 Simulating routinisation
Let’s bring out some issues more distinctly by considering the life-cycle of a linguistic routine,
adapting the mechanistic approaches in Logan (1988), Anderson (1992), Rawson (2004). Imagine
a (perhaps unusual) adult speaker of English encountering the following for the first time:
(10) Bob pulled some strings at work.
Given the capacity to construct a representation of this string, complete with a suitable construal
(e.g. determining that Bob does not physically handle string for a living), with repeated exposure
to this phrase our adult speaker can store this representation which she can later re-use. For this
speaker, ‘pull strings’ has become a pre-fab (i.e. conventionalised collocation, see Bybee (2006))
with the sense of (broadly) “manipulate”. In line with our dual processing perspective, we further
assume that updating proceeds via either the immediate use of lexical actions for constructing rep-
resentations from scratch, or else the reuse of stored representations outputted from previous use of
lexical actions. Following Logan, such interaction between competing options can be modelled as
a race between them to effect update.
At the beginning of the cycle of routinisation, rules may be favoured in such races due to their
generality (cf. Logan (1988), Rawson (2004)). But over time, richer contexts accumulate for the
output representations (via the surrounding words, etc) and within which processing takes place, so
that specialisation of these representations to specific contexts in which processing typically occurs,
leads to their being favoured over rules.7 The intermediate term is marked by a period of shifting
between one kind of processing and another, and over-specialisation of semantic structures can lead
to these failing to respond in novel contexts. Importantly, computational processing is still available
when such failure occurs, and may in fact reappear in such cases.8
However, what about the longer term? It is here that rules make a resurgence, in the form of
routines, or complexes of actions. Idioms are a good example of this, and various earlier accounts
have looked at the relative compositionality of these (e.g. Nunberg et al. (1994)). An implication
of Logan’s model seldom taken up is that computational processing never actually abandons the
race, and might even somehow gain a competitive edge (even after some period of dominance
by memory-based processing).9 We would suggest that various ways of effecting computational
efficiency, such as production compilation (see Taatgen et al. (2008)) could provide computational
6. Or even if it is more mechanistic than this, say, triggered by cues within memory.
7. We are of course talking about a probabilistic phenomenon, and a probabilistic version of the DS parser is currently
underway.
8. Our approach to coordinating the two processes in this way, albeit indirectly, attempts to extend the model in Logan
(1988) for linguistic purposes, and is in line with suggestions in the linguistics literature (e.g. Wray (2002) on
holophrastic processing operating in tandem with more analytical processing, Rawson and Middleton (2009) on
novelty and automaticity in text comprehension).
9. Recently, Rawson and Middleton (2009) has discussed Logan’s theory in similar terms (interestingly, by way of
proposing an account of the response of automatic processing to novelty).
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processing with the necessary boost to eventually win out over memory-based processing, thus
linking linguistic routinisation with models of automaticity in cognitive psychology. Production
compilation essentially involves linking together otherwise sequential, separate productions (each
with their own triggering conditions and output effects) into a complex unit with a single triggering
condition and combined output effects.10
2.4 Previous accounts
There is extensive work on routinisation (the process leading to the formation of routines) through-
out the cognitive sciences. Common to many such theories is the idea that routines arise from
practice, becoming points of stability in the face of contextual exigencies, typically expressed as a
list of various properties, such as their being: (i) rigid in form, (ii) somewhat truncated, (iii) rela-
tively non-compositional, (iv) yet highly specialised to the context (Ruh et al. (2005), Chernova and
Arkin (2007)). Such repetition effects are familiar enough from everyday experience, and this list
only hints at the complexity involved with routinisation. Within cognitive psychology, routinisation
surfaces chiefly in models of automaticity (e.g. Logan (1988), Anderson (1992), Bargh (1992)),
ranging from the more common property listing accounts, to the recently emerging mechanistic ap-
proaches (recently critiqued in Rawson (2004)). Within linguistics, routinisation surfaces chiefly
in the vast literature on formulaic language (e.g. Bolinger (1976), Jackendoff (1997), Erman and
Warren (2000), Sag et al. (2002)), much of which employs property-listing of one sort or another as
a key component of their modelling strategy.
Despite detailed accounts of routinisation phenomena within dialogue (e.g. Kuiper (1996), Ai-
jmer (1996)), these also involve extensive listing of properties, with little formal and computational
work in this area. Pickering and Garrod (2005) present an explicit, testable model of linguistic rou-
tinisation.11 However, their account lacks the formal details we require, despite their suggestions
for adapting ideas from Jackendoff (2003), the latter being a form of the property-list approach to
routinisation, which we are trying to avoid.
Rawson (2004) presents a non-property-listing alternative, demonstrating the usefulness of mech-
anistic approaches to linguistic modelling (see also Logan (1997)), comparing the rule-based ac-
count of Anderson (1992) to memory-based models of automaticity, such as that of Logan (1988),
in a series of reading experiments. While the results were complex, with memory-based processing
clearly driving the bulk of speed-up effects associated with practice (so that there were typically
reduced reading times for the same texts, but elevated times for novel texts), she did find evidence
for some involvement of rule-based processing, particularly in response to novel items. In our ac-
count, rather than devising our own models and possibly re-inventing several wheels, we look to
such models from psychology to provide the basis for our account of linguistic routinisation.
To capture earlier observations in Section (2.2) regarding the relative incrementality of linguistic
routines, as well as proposals for how such routines might emerge in Section (2.3), we suggest that
the dynamics of routinisation stems from the race between memory-based vs. rule-based processes.
Thus, the shift from the mid-term where memory-based processing holds sway, to the longer-term
10. Schematically, compiling two productions triggered by CONDITION1 and CONDITION2, and which lead to effects
UPDATE1 and UPDATE2, respectively, may lead to a rule with compound effects, but which does not require CONDI-
TION2 as a trigger, something like:
IF [CONDITION1] THEN [UPDATE1 ∧ UPDATE2]
11. Within Dynamic Syntax, Bouzouita (2008) proposes a way of formally modelling aspects of their account.
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where rule-based processing, via production compilation, becomes more competitive, is externally
verified by proposals from specific cognitive psychology accounts (chiefly Anderson (1992), Logan
(1988), Rawson (2004)). In this way, we formulate a novel account of the emergence of formulaic
language, in terms of the dynamics of the linguistic system, by extending the framework of Dynamic
Syntax (DS, e.g. Kempson et al. (2001), Cann et al. (2005)), especially as this has been applied to
dialogue (e.g. Purver et al. (2006)). We show how this yields not only a new explanation of the
continuum from the context specialisation of pre-fabs to selectivity of discontinuous idioms, but
further, we can employ the DS model of language processing as applied to dialogue phenomena, to
potentially model all manner of formulaic dialogue phenomena.
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3. Formal modelling
3.1 Formal details of the model
Informally, the Dynamic Syntax (DS, Kempson et al. (2001), Cann et al. (2005)) account of how
contextual information can be incorporated as it arises with linguistic information during dialogue,
has three main characteristics: fully incremental processing, modelling update as cycles of the
enrichment of underspecified representations, plus parity of parsing and production (formal details
for each below).
DS provides a fully incremental parsing model, with update modelled as transitions between
succeeding parse states, essentially, enrichment of partial tree structures. Parsing is then the se-
quence of pairings of natural language strings of terms s with the logical formula R representing the
semantic structure of those terms:
(11) {〈s(i), Ri〉 , 〈s(i+ 1), Ri+1〉 , . . .}
Thus, Ri results from parsing s(i). More generally, these successive parse states are modelled as
triples
(12) 〈PT, Fs, Fa〉
of (partial) tree structures PT , function Fs mapping partial tree structures to items of the formal
language, and function Fa mapping actions (from sets of actions, A) for transition between trees to
pairs of partial trees.
Structured logical formulae representing (predicate-argument) content are mapped to decorated
(binary) finite partial trees. Thus, parsing the string ‘Bob left’ results in the unreduced lambda
term ((λxLeft(x)), Bob), represented by the following decorated finite partial tree which includes
the decorations for the topmost, Ty(t) mother node (both formula Fo and typing information Ty
included):12
[0Fo(Left
′(Bob′)), T y(t)[0Fo(Bob
′), T y(e)][1Fo(λxLeft
′(x)), T y(e > t)]]
Dominance relations between nodes specify tree structure, from more local argument-daughter (≺0)
and function-daughter (≺1) relations between immediate neighbour nodes, to more global relations
holding over collections of nested sub-trees (neighbours of neighbours of nodes). Another cru-
cial component of the framework is a so-called LINK mechanism for constructing pairs of trees,
effectively conjoining the information contained in trees so linked (more below).13
Transitions from one PT to the next (in the sequence of updates) are effected through three
main kinds of actions:
- Lexical actions, a finite set of incremental actions associated with every word in the language,
the occurrence of this word effectively triggering this instruction set,
- Computational actions, a finite set of actions of a more general nature for building linguistic
structure, which are triggered independently of the occurrence of individual words, and finally
12. Following the bracketed format of Meyer-Viol (2001) signifying predicate-argument tree structure, where outermost
[0...] is the top level, subsequent [0...] enclose argument daughters within the tree, and any [1...] enclose function
daughters.
13. Linking symbolised via an 〈L〉 modality.
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- Pragmatic actions, a finite set of actions which operate to connect contextual information
with the current PT under construction.
Each of these “macro”-level actions are actually composed of lower-level constructional actions for
creating new nodes, decorating nodes, substitution at nodes, or else pointer movement.14 Regarding
this latter, the pointer device (symbolised by ♦) is central to modelling transitions, singling out the
specific node in the tree which is the current focus of update, pairing this node with the partial tree
currently under construction (Kempson et al. 2001, p. 275),15 this pairing then being an element of
the set of Pointed Partial Trees (PPTs).
An important feature of the eventual dialogue account (detailed below) is that, while parsing
may begin in the simplest cases with the so-called axiom, ?Ty(t), an initial state expressing the
requirement to simply build a propositional object, modelling sequences of contributions by suc-
ceeding interlocutors in dialogue may potentially require starting from any point along the partial
order of states (more below). Indeed, parsing could then start from a context provided by the previ-
ous speaker’s utterance (as we will see).
Summarising the presentation so far, the basic units of the framework (Kempson et al. 2001,
p. 269) are decorated PPTs, described using a language pairing elements from the set F of labels
or features, like Ty (“type”), Fo (“formula”) or Tn (“tree node”), with elements from the set D
of formulae (“decorations”), like e > t, λxLeft′(x) or 01, the latter effectively values for these
features (cf. attribute value matrices), but also including a set MV of metavariables (details of these
latter below).16
The enrichment of underspecified PPTs is crucial to the account of goal-directed information
growth for any dimension of tree structures and decorations (formula and type information). Three
kinds of underspecification are involved, structural, formula, and type value, the goal-directedness
of enrichment/update modelled explicitly in terms of requirements, so that for any label X , adding
a requirement ?X imposes a goal to establish X . All aspects of underspecification have an associ-
ated requirement for update, so that requirements may take the form ?Ty(t), ?Ty(e), ?Ty(e > t),
?〈↓〉Ty(e > t), ?∃xFo(x), ?∃xTn(x), etc. Pronouns illustrate formula underspecification, for
example, the pronoun he licensing projection of a metavariable Fo(UMale′(U)) of Ty(e) with re-
quirement ?∃xFo(x) (the latter a requirement for a fully specified formula). Such metavariables
are replaced by a SUBSTITUTION process from a term available in context. Names too are modelled
as projecting a metavariable, so that the occurrence of “Bill” projects a metavariable annotated as
Fo(UBill′(U)), with instruction to construct a LINK transition to a linked tree of topnode Ty(t)
decorated with the formula value Bill′(U), characterising the predicate being named Bill, this con-
stituting a constraint on the logical constant to be assigned as a construal of the use of that name in
the particular context. All such metavariable-based terms are then enriched via the pragmatic action
of Substitution, and which may itself be suitably constrained (e.g. see discussion in Purver et al.
(2006)).
14. Such basic actions can combine into complex ones. Suppressing some formal details (for which see (Meyer-Viol
2001, p. 171), (Kempson et al. 2001, p. 308)), basic actions include ones like make, put and go, which are very low
level actions for constructing and decorating nodes, and moving between sub-trees under construction. Macros of
actions can be assembled from basic actions, chained together with the Dynamic Logic concatenation operator ;. For
example, the procedure for moving to a particular node to decorate it with some fact or requirement is specified as:
make(R); go(R); put(φ); go(R−1).
15. Thus, Tn ≺i T ′n′ if T = T ′ and n ≺i n′ (for some i belonging to the set of dominance relations presented above).
16. This is somewhat simplified, for details see Kempson et al. (2001).
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3.2 Parity, dialogue and bi-directional grammars
In DS, interactional dynamics during dialogue can be captured directly in terms of the core resources
of the grammar, whereby the transition between speakers is modelled as the transition between
parsing states. DS models generation as driven by the same underlying processing mechanisms as
parsing, in common with many bi-directional grammars (e.g. Shieber (1988)), thereby ensuring
that generation is as incremental and goal-directed as parsing. In DS, a hearer builds a succession
of partial parse trees representing components of the speaker’s utterance. Speaking is modelled
in the same way, with the addition of a goal tree representing what the speaker wishes to say.17
Thus, a hearer can switch to speaking immediately and work from the same representation for both.
Further, parsing and generation can start from any point (Axiom being only one possibility), so
that interlocutors may in fact work off the immediately preceding context, or else from some store
of structures, both strategies being crucial for modelling routinisation in dialogue. We can then
model the switching back-and-forth between parsing and generation in a fully incremental way,
this providing a mechanism for the emergence of parity during dialogue.18 Such tight coupling of
goal-directed parsing and generation captures how interlocutors can make micro-adjustments in and
through the interaction itself, thus directly modelling how the emergent dialogue is shaped on the
fly through such fine-grained interaction between interlocutors.
More formally, Purver et al. (2006) define a parse state P as the triple 〈T,W,A〉, with T a
(possibly partial) tree,W the associated sequence of words, andA the associated sequence of lexical
and computational actions. At any point in the parsing process, the context C for a particular partial
tree T in the set P can be taken to consist of the results of previous parses {. . . , 〈Ti,Wi, Ai〉, . . .}.
Later we draw on this for our model of tripartite minimal exchanges, with the context consisting of
a parse state P ′ resulting from some utterance initiating the exchange, any partial trees established
in subsequent parsed fragments associated with some clarification or extension of aspects of P ′, and
finally partial trees established for the response of the initiating speaker.
The generation model consists of incremental (word-by-word) parsing, and lexicon search for
words which provide appropriate tree-update relative to a goal tree (what it is the speaker wishes to
say), and through this process speakers produce the natural language string associated with the goal
tree (Purver et al. (2006)). A generator state G is thus a pair 〈TG, X〉 consisting of:
(i) a goal tree TG, and
(ii) a set X of pairs 〈S, P 〉, S a candidate partial string, P an associated parser state.19
The context-dependence of generation comes to the fore where lexical search can include context
wherever possible, the effect being to reduce the production task. Such reuse of context drives
coordination between speakers via generation as well as parsing, the dynamics of this process arising
indirectly out of the interaction. The following example demonstrates reuse for simple question-
answer:
17. Being a so-called tactical generation model only, the question of how this is arrived at is put on hold for now.
18. Within cognitive science, parity involves sharing representations across processes within the same individual, such
as where representations for both speaking and hearing are built using the same underlying mechanism (Pickering
and Garrod (2004)). Bi-directionality is then an important ingredient within the present account of how parity across
understanding and generation systems is achieved, and is central to our modelling of dialogue phenomena based on
the DS grammar model.
19. As defined in Section (3.1) above.
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(13) A: Who left?B: Bill did.
From a DS perspective (e.g. Cann et al. (2007)), for their answer, B reuses the context provided by
interpreting A’s question (details below). Note that for A to understand B’s question, A needs to
understand it against the context of their own initial utterance.
Moreover, the combined incremental, goal-directed framework enables processing linguistic
strings sub-propositionally, making the DS dialogue model radically different to established ap-
proaches to dialogue modelling (e.g. Traum (1994), Asher and Lascarides (2003)) which retain
commitment to rather coarse-grained units of analysis, typically propositions.20 DS models the
processing of fragments in contexts as steps toward the construction of a fully propositional term,
so that grounding (the process whereby interlocutors arrive at mutual understanding of their utter-
ances) is driven sub-propositionally. There is ample evidence that during dialogue people quite
happily interact sub-propositionally, such as:21
(14)
TRAINS91, Dialogue 1.2, Lines 12.1 to 18.1
S: okay
: so we’ll say
M: send
S: E2
: I guess
: ... from Elmira
M: tshh
: yeah
S: and send them ...
M: to Corning
S: to Corning
Here, M and S switch turns, seemingly together constructing the eventual proposition. Of course,
each must understand the whole and where their own contribution fits, so each must separately
entertain some proposition commensurate with that expressed by the final utterance (or if not, then
they would know they were mistaken). For DS, such sub-propositional units are grammatical,22 and
interlocutors may be not only working toward constructing a propositional term (i.e. the output of a
complete tree), they may also be engaged in more partial interpretive work and processing material
at sub-propositional levels below this.
Our modelling strategy for dealing with the complex of dialogue phenomena is to recast this
in terms of a minimal exchange model, focusing directly on the initiative which dialogue agents
display in the following manner:
20. Although others have recently claimed to also be modelling sub-propositionally, e.g. Matheson et al. (2000), Poesio
and Rieser (2010).
21. Note that the format of the following dialogue from the TRAINS91 dialogue corpus
(http://www.cs.rochester.edu/research/speech/trains.html) is simplified for expository purposes. . . . represents
an extended pause of noticeable duration.
22. In the sense that grammaticality is relative to context, if when combined in suitable ways with some information from
context the result is a grammatical unit (for explicit definition of grammatical, outside our scope here, see Cann et al.
(2007).
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(i) A context tree: the START STATE - this is the tree the initiator is starting their parse from
(ii) A goal tree: the FINAL STATE - the initiator will end up with a tree matching this, if grounding
is successful
(iii) A construction tree: an INTERMEDIATE STATE bridging (i) and (ii), and which replaces the
context tree after every update step
This covers a range of core dialogue phenomena we are interested in modelling, such as clarifica-
tions, reformulations, and corrections, and we have demonstrated (e.g. Gargett et al. (2009)) that
our approach accounts for such core dialogue phenomena. However, it is also important to point
out that we are not currently explicitly modelling the content of such exchanges, and we are not
claiming to have (as yet) a complete dialogue model in this sense.
Let’s consider example (13) using a more schematic presentation of these three, inter-related
kinds of trees. In Table (1), the context for step 1 is the following already formed tree structure
resulting from B’s parse of A’s question, including both the subject node decorated with WH , and
predicate node decorated with Left′:
(15)
Ty(t), Fo(Left′(WH)),♦
Fo(WH),
T y(e)
Fo(Leave′)
Ty(e > t)
In our example, the subject node is updated with information licensed by occurrence of ‘Bob’,
this reflecting B’s analysis of A’s question (plus relevant wider knowledge that Bob is the correct
answer in this case). Next, occurrence of ‘did’ licenses update in accordance with the following
lexical actions (see Purver et al. (2006) for details):23
(16)
‘Do’ IF ?Ty(e > t)
THEN put(Fo(U)); put(Ty(e > t))
put(?∃x.Fo(x))
ELSE ABORT
Having uttered ‘did’, the next update step 2 in Table (1) requires specifying the metavariable Fo(U)
decorating the predicate node, by enabling reuse of the formula decorating the Ty(e > t) node of
the tree in (15).
The dynamics of the process stem from how construction trees iteratively become in turn context
trees for subsequent construction trees, with a progression of construction trees recycled as context.
These cycles of contribution-response-contribution enable narrowing of focus to a specific point in
the representation under construction, providing interlocutors the opportunity for quite fine-grained
adjustments of understanding.24
23. For convenience, we are ignoring tense information.
24. So that such continual switching of speakers does not necessarily indicate misunderstanding and breakdown of com-
munication.
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CONTEXTB: CONSTRUCTIONB: GOALB:
STEP 1
?Ty(t)
Bill′,
T y(e)
Ty(e > t),♦
?Ty(t)
Bill′,
T y(e)
Fo(U),
T y(e > t),
?∃x.Fo(x),
♦
STEP 2
?Ty(t)
Bill′,
T y(e)
Fo(U),
T y(e > t),
?∃x.Fo(x),
♦
?Ty(t)
Bill′,
T y(e)
Fo(U),
T y(e > t),
?∃x.Fo(x),
♦
⇑
Fo(Left′)
Ty(t), Left′(Bill′)
Bill′,
T y(e)
Fo(Left′)
Ty(e > t)
STEP 3
?Ty(t)
Bill′,
T y(e)
Fo(U),
T y(e > t),
?∃x.Fo(x),
♦
⇑
Fo(Left′)
Ty(t), Left′(Bill′),♦
Bill′,
T y(e)
Fo(Left′),
T y(e > t)
Table 1: Tripartite model of minimal exchanges: simple question and answer. Note that the predi-
cate information Fo(Left′) substituted into the construction tree in Step 2, is provided by B’s own
representation of A’s previous utterance of ‘Who left?’ (see discussion of (15) for details).
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4. From prefabs to idioms in language use
This section attempts a formal demonstration of the approach to routinisation suggested in Sec-
tions (2.3) and (2.4), whereby pre-fabs emerge within focused dialogue over the intermediate term,
with increasing efficiency of lexical actions over the longer term. Another source of contact with
our hybrid modelling approach in the literature are the results from the psycholinguistic investi-
gation of idioms by Sprenger et al. (2006). Their model is hybrid between idioms being unitary,
at a conceptual level, and compositional, at a lexemic level. Thus, the particular lemma ‘bucket’
will be activated for both the literal and idiomatic meanings of ‘kicked the bucket’, but the source
of activation of the lemma is different in each case. However, the formal model in Sprenger et al.
(2006) focuses on linking distinct syntactic and semantic/conceptual levels, whereas we focus on
the additional aspects of the dynamics of such links in contexts of interaction.
In what follows, we provide details of our extension to the core DS framework, incorporating
hybrid rule-based and memory-based modelling, and formally detailing a dual process model of the
emergence of formulaic language. We finish by drawing out the other thread pursued in this paper,
that of incremental context-dependence of formulaic language, demonstrating this in a dialogue
setting. Note that while the analyses in what follows involve constructed data, we are currently
extending our analyses to actual dialogue data (such as that reported in Healey (1997), discussed in
Section (2.2.2) above).
4.1 Extending the core DS account
Our aim here is to extend the DS framework, by modelling lexical entries as nodes within a network
of such entries, consisting of tuples 〈w, T,A〉 of phonological information w, semantic structure T
and lexical actionsA. These nodes are accessed primarily through recognising/producing sequences
of phonological strings wiwjwk . . ., so that nodes may themselves consist in part of string sets
such as those for ‘kick’, ‘kick himself’, ‘kick herself’, ‘kick themselves’, etc (more details on the
structure of lexical entries below). This leads to transitions between states being effected either
via lexical actions, triggering building of tree structure by basic actions (as noted in Section (3.1)
above), or else by directly contributing (previously stored) structure at the appropriate place in the
unfolding tree structure.
In what follows, we first consider the formal modelling issues which formulaic language presents,
then suggest how fixed idiomatic forms may emerge from relatively less fixed pre-fabs. Finally,
we will show how relevant lexical entries can be extended, before finishing this subsection with a
schematic presentation of our formal proposal for extending DS lexical entries to lexical nodes.
4.1.1 BASIC LEXICAL ENTRIES
As mentioned, nodes may consist of sets of phonological strings, together with some associated
lexical actions, such as (in all following examples we ignore tense for convenience):25
25. Note the use of relational operators for various purposes, including locating the current node within the larger tree
structure, such as 〈↓1〉Ty(e > t), which specifies that at the function daughter below the current node is one of
Ty(e > t), or even for pointing out a direction, as in go(〈↑0〉), which is to say, “go up the argument (’0’) branch
from here”.
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(17)
kick IF ?Ty(e > t)
THEN make(〈↓1〉), go(〈↓1〉),
put(Fo(λxy.Kick′(xy)), T y(e > (e > t)))
go(〈↑1〉),make(〈↓0〉), go(〈↓0〉), put(?Ty(e))
ELSE ABORT
(18)
Xself IF ?Ty(e > t)
THEN put(Fo(UAnaph) ∧ Ty(e))
ELSE ABORT
Note that the operation of the reflexive also relies on a special local version of the pragmatic action
Substitution, which enriches the metavariable decorating the object node with the formula informa-
tion decorating the subject node (following the analysis in Cann et al. (2005)).
Now, applying the lexical entries in (17) and (18) capture non-idiomatic meaning only - but
consider the occurrence of idiomatic ‘Bob kicked himself’(=“Bob reproached himself”). Recall
from Section (2.1) the following schematic sequence of transitions for this idiomatic expression,
repeating here the previous analysis that parsing this expression involves stepping through one less
state than the non-idiomatic expression:
(19) S1 Bob→ S2 kicked himself−→ S3
Upon completing a parse of this sequence we might arrive at the following final state (the formula-
tion of names here is simplified, but see Gargett (2010) for details):
(20)
Ty(t), Fo(Reproach′(Bob′)(Bob′))♦
Ty(e)
Bob′
Ty(e > t)
Fo(λy.Reproach′(Bob′)(y))
Ty(e)
Bob′
Ty(e > (e > t))
Fo(λxy.Reproach′(x)(y))
We need to show how our model captures the entire sequence of updates leading to (20) by pro-
viding lexical actions for the idiomatic expression. Rather than simply stipulating these directly,
the advantage of the dual process account we are taking is that we are able to model the process
underlying the emergence of these entries (specifically, the memory-based processing of these in
terms of their access and retrieval).
4.1.2 THE EMERGENCE AND STORAGE OF SEMANTIC STRUCTURES
We propose that the sequence of the verb kick plus reflexive himself becomes routinised over time,
with storage of the semantic structure outputted at the associated parse states S2 and S3, essentially
the tree in example (20). Over time, there will be an accumulation of many instances of such output,
for example, both of the following:
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(21)
{Tn(0), Fo(Reproach′(Mary′)(Mary′)), T y(t)}
{〈↑0〉Tn(0), Fo(Mary
′), T y(e)}
{〈↑1〉Tn(0), Fo(λx.Reproach
′(Mary′)(x)), T y(e > t)}
{〈↑0↑1〉Tn(0), Fo(Mary), T y(e)}
{〈↑1↑1〉Tn(0), Fo(λxy.Reproach
′(y)(x)), T y(e > (e > t))}
(22)
{Tn(0), Fo(Reproach′(Bob′)(Bob′)), T y(t)}
{〈↑0〉Tn(0), Fo(Bob
′), T y(e)}
{〈↑1〉Tn(0), Fo(λx.Reproach
′(Bob′)(x)), T y(e > t)}
{〈↑0↑1〉Tn(0), Fo(Bob), T y(e)}
{〈↑1↑1〉Tn(0), Fo(λxy.Reproach
′(y)(x)), T y(e > (e > t))}
By virtue of being stored locally, these largely similar semantic structures may be related via a
process of tree abstraction. Here we adapt a proposal by Wilfried Meyer-Viol to formalise how
such abstraction might proceed.26 Recall that update via the transition function involves moving the
unfolding tree structure along the partial order ≤ from less to more specified states. The basic idea
of abstraction involves moving backwards along ≤, effectively unwinding the complete tree to an
earlier point at whichever nodes the information of the source trees differs, replacing any formulae
at these nodes with metavariables and requirements for an Fo. Thus, the structures in examples (21)
and (22) can be abstracted as follows:
(23)
{Tn(0), ?Ty(t)}
{〈↑0〉Tn(0), Fo(U), ?∃yFo(y), ?Ty(e)}
{〈↑1〉Tn(0), ?Ty(e > t)}
{〈↑0↑1〉Tn(0), Fo(U), ?∃xFo(x), ?Ty(e)}
{〈↑1↑1〉Tn(0), Fo(λxy.Reproach
′(y)(x)), T y(e > (e > t))}
The resulting abstracted tree in (23) is not an expected output of parsing some utterance in English:
although the verb node is fixed and decorated with a fully specified formula, the subject node is
fixed yet also decorated by an underspecified formula expression.27 Such abstraction essentially
pinpoints the similarities in these structures, and might be expected from structures being stored
locally within some network of such structures, as a memory-based effect (discussed further below).
The metavariables here represent kinds of abstractions over the places they are the holder for. These
places were originally occupied by items which had some similarity with respect to each other, in
most general terms (employing featural definition of categories) this involved [+animacy], and more
specifically, it involved [+human].
Note that metavariables at both subject and object nodes in (23) are identical, and this captures
the identity of the formulae at these nodes resulting from occurrence of the reflexive (see (18)
above). Yet, as it stands, our analysis is incomplete, since we need to derive a structure which
can be employed incrementally at the appropriate point in the parse. Recall the schematic of this
sequence in (19): after the occurrence of ‘Bob’, the parse state is as follows:
26. Personal communication, Ms.
27. A node can of course be unfixed and decorated with underspecified formula, as occurs in the case of left-dislocation,
see Kempson et al. (2001) for details.
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(24)
?Ty(t)
Ty(e)
Bob′
?Ty(e > t),♦
Proceeding to the next update step via stored semantic structure requires retrieval of a sub-tree with
topmost node of type ?Ty(e > t). However, the tree in example (23) contains a subject node, which
is superfluous since we require only information stored for the combined predicate and object (i.e.
in DS terms, the sub-tree with topmost node of type Ty(e > t)). At this point, we do not have a
detailed theoretical account of how such superfluous information might be discarded.28 For now,
we simply prune structure above the Ty(e > t) node, with the result as follows:
(25)
{〈↑1〉Tn(0), ?Ty(e > t)}
{〈↑0↑1〉Tn(0), Fo(Fo(UAnaph) ∧ Ty(e))}
{〈↑1↑1〉Tn(0), Fo(λxy.Reproach
′(y)(x)), T y(e > (e > t))}
The final version in (25) models the structure that would provide update of the partial tree in (24).
Note that this additional step extends the original abstraction operation by decorating the object
node with a reflexive anaphor (to which can be applied the special local version of Substitution
advocated by Cann et al. (2005) for reflexives), this being triggered during the pruning process by
identical metavariables occurring on subject and object nodes of (23).
4.1.3 EXTENDING LEXICAL ENTRIES
Crucial to our proposed account of the dynamics of the emergence of formulaic language (as dis-
cussed in Section (2.3) above) is the competition between lexical actions and semantic structures to
update the tree currently under construction, in response to occurrences of the phonological string.
Thus, the occurrence of ‘kick himself’ sets in train a race between the processes underlying both
lexical actions and semantic structure, to produce the material which updates the unfolding tree
structure through the sequence of transitions represented above in (19). Depending on the outcome
of this race, it may be the abstracted semantic structure in (25) which updates the unfolding tree,
or it may be the lexical actions triggered by ‘kick’ followed by those triggered by ‘himself’. We
consider this account to be essentially a linguistic recasting of Logan’s model of automaticity (see
Section (2.4) for details).
We saw in Section (4.1.2) how semantic structures might emerge and provide structure for up-
dating the tree currently under construction. We propose that a semantic structure suitably optimised
(such as after undergoing the pruning process described in Section (4.1.2)), would win the race to
provide update. Indeed, the degree of specialisation of the semantic structure for the particular
context, leads to it taking over update of the parse state.
Now, keeping with our linguistically inspired extension of Logan’s model, the only way that
the lexical action can become competitive again, and thus take over processing in response to the
occurrence of, say, idiomatic ‘kick himself’ or ‘kick herself’, is if somehow there is a reduction in
processing time. An obvious mechanism for this is the use of procedural compilation in various
models of working memory (e.g. ACT-R, Taatgen et al. (2008), discussed further below).
28. For example, some way of restricting extraction to that information from context which is “relevant” is likely needed,
although we do not currently have a way of operationalising such a notion of relevance of information.
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We propose then that lexical rules may undergo their own form of optimisation in order to
become once again competitive in this process, in particular through a process of procedural com-
pilation, whereby lexical actions are chained together to provide complexes of such actions. The
resulting complex lexical action for idiomatic ‘kick oneself’ is as follows:
(26)
kick
oneself IF ?Ty(e > t)
THEN make(〈↓1〉), go(〈↓1〉),
put(Fo(λxy.Reproach′(x)(y)), T y(e > (e > t))),
go(〈↑1〉),make(〈↓0〉), go(〈↓0〉),
put(Fo(UAnaph) ∧ Ty(e))
ELSE ABORT
Note that the lexical entry in (26) for ‘kick oneself’ contains additional procedures for decorating
the tree node with the 010 address (the object node),29 these additional procedures being deployed
by extending the formalism for lexical actions with the AND structuring device for bundling together
procedures dealing with both ‘kick’ as well as ‘oneself’ into a more complex lexical action for ‘kick
oneself’.
4.1.4 INTERIM SUMMARY
In summary, the mechanism we are proposing for the emergence of linguistic routines is quite
indirect, driven by the competition between semantic structure and lexical actions.30 It should be
emphasised that of course DS provides the possibility that either actions or structures can be used as
possible updates for the unfolding tree structure, so of course we could well have represented (23)
in terms of actions rather than structure. However, what we are seeking here is a way of using these
formal mechanisms to model processes underlying the patterns we see in dialogue in cognitive
terms. To this end, these structures are employed to suggest a memory-based account for how
outputs of the parser may be stored and reused on subsequent occasions (perhaps even over the
much longer term in the case of stable forms of formulaic language).
Further, we have shown that, despite idioms involving skipping over some state/s, rather than
stepping through each and every possible individual state (recall discussion in Section (2.1)), the
process is still incremental, just that there are overall fewer actual transitions between states, this
being the effect of more the complex lexical actions for idioms.31
4.1.5 ARCHITECTURE OF LEXICAL NODES
Now, while our model integrates rules and stored structures, both are essentially computational.32
The final component in our dual process account is to fully implement retrieval of structures in
29. Reading the address from right to left, and thereby “back up” the tree: argument daughter (0) of function daughter
(1) of the root node (0).
30. Note how close we are to the account in Kecskes (2008) of the dynamics of linguistic meaning arising from the
interplay between current knowledge and growing experience.
31. In fact, as pointed out by an astute reviewer, as this entry stands, it may suggest that no concept of ‘kick’ is accessed
when invoking the entry in (26). This is not intended by our account, although at this stage we are unable to directly
address this issue. As noted immediately below, we intend revisiting these and other issues, in particular in light of a
recent model proposed by Sprenger et al. (2006).
32. Via lexical procedures, on the one hand, and via tree abstraction, on the other.
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a properly memory-based fashion, in order to simulate competition between update by either rule-
based computation or via retrieval of structure. In Gargett (2010), we propose modelling this compe-
tition in terms of retrieval of semantic structures conditioned through the manipulation of activation
weights, and also in terms of utilities assigned to productions that govern how these operate (e.g.
their speed).33 These aspects of our model are currently being implemented, and details of these are
not included here.
Our dual processing account of lexical architecture models lexical nodes as consisting not only
of strings and lexical actions for computing representations, but also stored semantic structure. Fig-
ure (1) presents a schematic model of lexical nodes: each lexical node being bundles of phonological
strings, lexical actions and semantic structures. These semantic structures are essentially the struc-
tures outputted from previous uses of the associated lexical actions. Accessing the information in
these nodes is essentially via phonological strings (noted above), ranging from more compositional
(like ‘kick’), to more formulaic (like ‘kick himself’, ‘kick herself’, ‘kick themselves’). By mak-
ing both rules and structures available via some string set, our proposal aims to reflect the hybrid
compositional/formulaic nature of the lexicon (e.g. Sprenger et al. (2006)).34
LEXICAL
NODE
Phon
LexActs
SemStr
Figure 1: Representation of lexical nodes (Phon = phonological material, LexActs = lexical actions,
SemStr = stored semantic structures)
In summary, we have shown with our series of examples employing tree abstraction, that this
enables modelling the interaction between the processes that give rise to semantic structures as well
as the process whereby these structures may be stored and subsequently retrieved. The result is a
33. Such weights degrade over time, thereby modelling recency effects, so that both storing and retrieval of semantic
structures, say, boosts their activation levels, and analogously, for the utility levels of productions when successfully
firing.
34. Indeed, a crucial element of Sprenger et al.’s account is the relationship between the lexical and conceptual levels,
which is beyond the scope of our proposal here. We are not here proposing a full-fledged lexical architecture, and
our highly schematic model presented here does not detail the links between specific phonological forms and specific
actions and/or semantic representations, required to model how uttering ‘kick himself’ increases the likelihood of
use of the semantic representation for this specific string. Indeed, in order to develop a more detailed account, we
will aim for a model along the lines of the proposal in Sprenger et al. (2006), but bringing this in line with our more
procedural approach.
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unified story of formulaic and non-formulaic language,35 extending the DS lexicon to consist of a
network of nodes, each consisting of strings (as the locus of lexical entries), with their associated
lexical actions (core linguistic knowledge) and semantic structures (accumulating via “linguistic”
experiences).
4.2 Idioms in context
Finally, we demonstrate how our approach draws on aspects of the DS grammar model, to model
idioms in dialogue. Consider the following examples of the idiom ‘kick oneself’:
(27) A: Bob kicked himselfB: and so did Jill?
By way of demonstrating how dialogue phenomena are modelled in DS via core grammatical re-
sources, Table (2) displays an analysis of example (27). First, on our extended model, given the
idiomatic reading of A’s utterance, there are two possible routes to constructing a representation of
A’s utterance: (i) use of the complex lexical actions for idiomatic reading of A’s utterance (as set
out in (26)), (ii) retrieval of long-term stored structure for the idiomatic reading (displayed in (25)).
In accordance with our dual process account, each of these are viable alternatives which compete
against one another to provide update. Second, B’s response in (27) cannot mean that Jill kicked
Bob, so that if immediate context is reused here, this cannot consist of the output structure, com-
plete with its value for the metavariable, since this would wrongly allow the meaning Jill kicked
Bob. However, depending on which was initially used, complex actions or else stored semantic
structure, this would be available for reuse in this case.
This analysis reveals where we need to focus future work. For B’s response to A, a DS analysis
of “do” posits a metavariable of Ty(e > t), enabling substitution of predicate information from
context, with an obvious candidate being the stored semantic structure retrieved for parsing A’s ut-
terance (see (25)). Another candidate may in fact be the structure immediately following application
of the complex lexical action triggered by the idiom (see (26)). For the analysis in Table (2), both
alternatives, reuse of complex actions and retrieval of semantic structure, are theoretically possible
given our dual process account (see Section (4.1)). Determining the strategy actually selected in
this competition is an implementation issue; in future work we aim to implement the proposal in
Section (4.1.5), modelling the competition between lexical actions and semantic structure in these
terms.
35. While we focus processing at the level of lexical nodes, others have suggested distributing this across multiple lexica
(contra Becker (1975), Wray (2002), among others).
192
INCREMENTALITY AND ROUTINES IN DIALOGUE
CONTEXT TREE: CONSTRUCTION TREE:
UPDATE 1 “Bob kicked himself”
?Ty(t)
Ty(e)
Bob′
?Ty(e > t)
♦
?Ty(t)
Ty(e)
Bob′
?Ty(e > t)
Ty(e) ∧
UAnaph,♦
Ty(e > (e > t))
Reproach′
UPDATE 2 “and so did Jill”
?Ty(t)
Ty(e)
Jill′
?Ty(e > t),
Fo(V),♦
?Ty(t)
Ty(e)
Jill′
?Ty(e > t)
⇑
Ty(e) ∧
UAnaph,♦
Ty(e > (e > t))
Reproach′
Table 2: B’s Context and Construction trees for example (27). Updates to the context tree licensed
by idiomatic reading of the string are symbolised by the blue dashed line (although these dashed
lines are for expository purposes, and have no formal significance). Note that for Update 2, the
separate steps of update from context and then resolving reference via a local form of Substitution to
ensure identical formulae on subject and object nodes, are placed together on the same tree diagram
for convenience, but they are in fact separate steps. The grayed section in Update 2 highlights the
subtree drawn from context (in fact the Ty(e > t) subtree from the construction tree in Update 1).
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5. Conclusions: modelling context and routinisation in dialogue
We have provided a novel dual process account of modelling the dynamics of formulaic language, as
an alternative to the more common property listing approach. By setting our account firmly within
the DS framework, we retain features of this framework useful for modelling. Taking this approach,
we can straightforwardly extend the framework to model routine dialogue phenomena. We extend
the DS lexical architecture in order to model the emergence of formulaic language indirectly, within
a model of language that focuses on replicating the processes underlying patterns of usage.
Our focus on the relationship between idioms and prefabs demonstrates the DS model of lan-
guage as a system flexible enough to provide multiple strategies for a single form. An additional
novel aspect of our approach to linguistic routinisation, is that we provide a unified account of pro-
cessing, focusing this at the level of lexical nodes, rather than distributing this across multiple lexica
as has been proposed elsewhere.
In sum, our contributions are fourfold: (1) a unified approach to formulaic and non-formulaic
language, (2) a novel dual process account of formulaic language, (3) an extension of DS, in particu-
lar with respect to lexical architecture, and (4) a model of the dynamics of linguistic routinisation in
dialogue. As an added bonus, our account turns out to be a linguistic implementation of the model
for routinisation originally proposed by Logan from within cognitive psychology, directly demon-
strating how the complexity of dialogue can be tackled by integrating insights across disciplines
within cognitive science.
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